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Reflections on Commission Research
Alan C. Cairns*
1.

INTRODUCTION

This paper explores the role of research in royal commissions. It is
based primarily on my experience as one of three research directors for the
Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for
Canada, popularly known as the Macdonald Commission. Since royal
commissions appear in many guises, much of what I say may not apply to
other commissions. In general, my remarks are more applicable to those
commissions that give advice on significant public policy matters than to more
narrowly investigative commissions set up in response to allegations of
corruption or scandal in government or to determine the causes of serious
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Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia; Director of
Research (Political Science) Macdonald Royal Commission on the Economic Union and
Development Prospects for Canada.
Several paragraphs and occasional sentences in the following pages are taken from an
unpublished lecture by the author, "The Macdonald and Other Royal Commissions: Their
Role in Public Policy," the 1986 David Alexander Lecture delivered at Memorial University, November 3, 1986. The author wishes to thank Cynthia Williams, Doug Williams and
Paul Pross for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Doug Williams has drawn my attention to the possible paradox that the Rowell-Sirois
Commission, with little intellectual capital to build on, knew where it was going from the
beginning, while the Macdonald Commission, much more favourably circumstanced in
terms of available academic literature, took much longer to untrack itself and find a sense
of direction.
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accidents. In these latter, essentially judicial, commissions, there is little need
for the extensive social science research used in such policy inquiries as the
Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois), the
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Laurendeau-Dunton)
and the Macdonald Commission.
Major policy-oriented royal commissions typically leave a double legacy
a report and published volumes of research. Individual research volumes,
such as the Rowell-Sirois study by W.A. Mackintosh on The Economic
Background of Dominion-ProvincialRelations,2 occasionally attain the status
of classics. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism
published more than two dozen supporting research monographs that filled a
yawning knowledge gap in the understanding of the crucial political issue of
Canadian dualism. As a byproduct, the commission created a cadre of researchers for future studies after it had expired as a corporate body.3
In general, royal commission research, both by its specific shaping effect
on many of the researchers and by the diffuse long-run impact of its published
research on the scholarly community, stimulates an enduring scholarly focus
on the commission's policy agenda. In this way, royal commissions counter
the narcissistic introspection to which academic disciplines occasionally
succumb and remind academics of the social obligations of scholarship.
The Macdonald Commission's research legacy is substantial. The 70
volumes of research distributed in English by the University of Toronto Press
have sold more than 100,000 copies.4 As several of the volumes are used as
university texts, steady sales will continue for some time. My unsystematic
observation of the recent literature of Canadian politics also suggests that the
5
research volumes are widely used by political scientists.
The rationale for this extensive research output came from the most
ambitious mandate given to a royal commission in Canadian history.
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W.A. Mackintosh, The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations, ed. J.H.
Dales (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964).
One of the most ambitious research projects of recent decades, Kenneth McRae's ongoing
multivolume study of four multilingual western democracies-Switzerland, Belgium, Finland and Canada-was stimulated by his senior research role on the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission. Two volumes have appeared, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Socities: Switzerland (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983) and
Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 1986).
All research volumes are also available in French from the Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa.
Ronald Watts, referring mainly to the federalism research, stated: "Although the quality of
these studies is uneven, the body of research will undoubtedly provide, for many years,
invaluable materials for scholars, students, and policy-makers." "The Macdonald Commission Report and Canadian Federalism," (1986) 16 Publius at 179.
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THE MACDONALD COMMISSION 1982-1985

The Commission's comprehensive, open-ended mandate, made public in
November 1982, was sometimes paraphrased in the aphorism "[Tihe universe
is in trouble, please advise." The Commission simultaneously confronted the
unfinished agenda of constitutional reform left behind after the 1982 Constitution Act and a battery of issues related to Canadian economic performance in a
tougher, leaner world.
The two main surviving constitutional issues from two decades of intergovernmental struggle were the reform of central government institutions and
the accommodation of the Quebec government that had angrily rejected the
agreement hammered out in November 1981. Although clearly on the
Commission's agenda, these political and constitutional concerns lacked the
urgency of the economic issues. The ConstitutionAct of 1982, whatever its
imperfections - including its rejection by the Quebec government - was in
place. Reforms to serve such political values as regional responsiveness and
accountability appeared to be of lesser priority than a commission response to
the inadequate performance of the economy in terms of inflation, unemployment, low productivity and conflictual labour-management relations.
The economic issues focussed on the role of the state in the domestic
economy and Canada's position in the global economy. The former included
the issue of the fragmentation of the Canadian economic union that the federal
government had put on the table in the summer of 1980 and which indeed
was part of the title of the commission. The latter, how Canada would relate to
the international economy, required an assessment of the likely future evolution of the post-World War II liberal international economic order and the
devising of policy for the best way to change, or render more secure, the
growing dependence of Canadian export trade on the United States market.
The Commission thus had to deal with many topics. Such topics of
concern included the politically explosive issue of Canadian-American
relations, with the 1911 reciprocity election as a reminder that this was sensitive territory indeed; the related issue of the positioning of Canada in a global
economy characterized by Darwinian economic competition; the debate over
the domestic economic and social role of the state that was on the political
agenda of democratic governments throughout the west, reflecting both the
neo-conservative resurgence and the recession of the '70s; and the need to
assess the viability of parliamentary government and federalism, now joined
by the Charteras a third constitutional pillar, in the light of anticipated future
demands on the Canadian state.
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Honourable Jean Chretien, Securing the Canadian Economic Union in the Constitution
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1980).
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This intimidating mandate was handed over to an unusually large group
of 12 commissioners and a chairperson. The latter, Donald S. Macdonald, a
former Minister of Finance and a lawyer, led an intellectually, politically and
occupationally diverse group of Commissioners. His was a difficult role, not
becasue the Commissioners were a particularly fractious group, but because
their varied backgrounds gave them differing perspectives on their collective
task.
The Commission undertook extensive hearings across Canada. The first
round of hearings in the fall of 1983 lasted 59 days and elicited over 1100
briefs and over 700 oral presentations. A shorter second round of hearings in
five cities over 15 days in the spring of 1984 generated feedback to the
Commission's interim discussion paper Challenges and Choices.' The public
hearings were supplemented by many private consultations with provincial
governments, interest groups and experts.
The magnitude of the Commission's task was summed up by Senator
Loma Marsden, a critic of the report, who claimed that "the terms of reference were impossibly wide, the Commissioners impossibly numerous and
diverse, [and] the time constraints impossibly short."' The terms of reference
had a sunset clause requiring the Commission to report within three years of
its establishment. Given the time required to get such a complex operation
underway and the wind-down time necessary for writing, editing, translating
and printing the report in both official languages, this was a heroic timetable.
The Commission's three-volume report appeared in September 1985 and 70
volumes of research in both English and French were published over the next
several months. 9 The heterogeneous makeup of the Commission contributed
to supplementary statements (minority reports) by six Commissioners who
disagreed with particular proposals.
Much of the life of the Commission was dominated by the effort to come
to terms with the breadth of the mandate. For the first two-thirds of its existence there was a pervasive uncertainty about what would be the ultimate focus
of attention of the Commissioners. Beyond the broadest generalities it was not
known what the final report would cover, how long it would be, who would
write it, how its audience should be defined, and whether its style should be
analytically rigourous - and thus based on the academic disciplines represented in research - or more exhortative and populist. The relative importance of the hearings and research in contributing to the substance of the future

7
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Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada,
Challenges and Choices (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1984).
Loma R. Marsden, "The Macdonald Commission on Canadian Labour and Labour
Markets: Some Sociological Questions," mimeo, presented to the International Canadian
Studies Conference, Hamilton, June 2, 1987 at 5.
At the time of writing, October 1988, two research volumes were still outstanding.
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report was also unclear. For much of its existence, the Commission's efforts
were directed towards a target that could only dimly be discerned.
This openness and uncertainty was written large over the Commission's
interim document, Challenges and Choices, released halfway through its
three year mandate and after the first round of hearings. The generally negative reception of the indecisive Challenges and Choices, along with the
inescapable necessity of finding a structure and sense of direction for the
looming final report, meant that the third year was devoted to developing the
Commission's policy recommendations, working out the underlying philosophy that should undergird them and writing the final report. Although
Challenges and Choices consumed a considerable amount of the Commission's scarcest resource, time, and had short-run negative effects on both
internal morale and external evaluation of the commission, it was a valuable
learning experience. The Commission was learning by doing, in the same way
that a student who has produced a weak M.A. thesis may produce a better
Ph.D. thesis than a fellow student who skips the M.A. stage and goes straight
to the Ph.D.
3.

NOT A BUREAUCRACY LIKE THE OTHERS

The royal commission is a bureaucracy with a difference. Its ephemeral
existence, absence of routinization, task specificity and independent status
distinguish it from the ongoing departments of government with their permanent staff, bureaucratic memory, subordination to political authority and enduring institutional concerns for their own survival and future strength.
A royal commission is made up of a temporary assemblage of personnel
drawn from many backgrounds. They have only a short-term commitment to
each other, to the organization and to their common task. They are often on
loan from other employers and they cannot be indifferent to their postcommission existence.
Each royal commission commences with a clean slate. There are no
bureaucratic memories and no old hands to educate newcomers in the genre's
workings. Thus, each stage in the life of a royal commission is a new
challenge, the response to which is not preplanned or predictable. For its
major activities - the hearings, research and report writing - there is no
routinization, for they are not cyclically repeated activities following the
seasons or the budget year, but are only experienced once."0
In the Macdonald Commission this basic fluidity was compounded by the
fact that many of the key participants were neither full-time nor located in
Ottawa. While there was an ongoing core of administrative staff at head-
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There may, of course, be more than one round of hearings, and an interim report may be
published.
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quarters, the Commissioners themselves did not move to Ottawa and they did
not drop all of their former responsibilities. Except when on the road during
the hearings, or on their frequent commuting trips to Ottawa, the Commissioners operated from their .various home bases. Further, the bulk of the
research was undertaken by university-based academics scattered across the
country who retained their normal teaching responsibilities, to which they
added a specific piece of contract research. For most of the individual researchers, working on a small project on a contract basis, the Commission probably existed at the margin of their attention most of the time. Both their knowledge of and psychological involvement in the Commission were limited.
Even among those more intensively involved in the research program - the
three research directors, and the coordinators of the 19 research subfields most continued their teaching and university administrative responsibilities,
sometimes at a reduced level.
Given these organizational attributes, also shared by other large commissions, the success of such commissions in producing reasonable responses to
their mandates is impressive. In part, and especially for commissioners and
senior staff, extra effort is elicited by a civic sense of participating in a significant public activity. The memory of past commissions that have issued
landmark reports, substantially influenced a major policy area, or both, is a
constant reminder of the judgment day ahead. A chairperson knows that his or
her reputation will be profoundly influenced by the quality of the report issued
under his or her name.
Within limits, the fluidity, uncertainty and unpredictability that pervade
the existence of a large commission are functional. Intellectually, on the
Macdonald Commission, they prevented premature closure on issues that
might be viewed differently when the results of the hearings and research
were fed into the Commission. Politically, this openness worked against the
creation of identifiable minorities among the Commissioners at an early stage,
and thus probably helped to maintain group cohesion. With a large and
heterogeneous commission, early decisions on basic policy issues that might
not obtain a commission consensus would have risked turning the commission
into a multi-party system with minority commissioners psychologically readying themselves for their anticipated dissenting minority reports." Bureaucratically, an instant organization composed of individuals who have not previously worked together and who face rather ill-defined future tasks is incompatible
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The practice of appointing a large commission, whose membership mirrors much of the
relevant diversity of the society its proposals are to affect, threatens harmony among
commissioners. The effort to enhance a commission's legitimacy by making the commissioners a microcosm of the social divisions they seek to transcend puts an inappropriately
heavy burden on commissions to mobilize consent and detracts from their more intellectual
task of education and policy clarification.
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with an inflexible regime of rules and a predetermined assignment of roles and
responsibilities. The appropriate philosophy to guide the organization of a
royal commission must facilitate the recurrent rearrangement of commission
personnel in the light of new tasks and ongoing assessments of individual
performance.
If the Macdonald Commission is typical of the large policy-oriented
commissions, there is a recurrent and inescapable crisis atmosphere. This
coincides with a great deal of groping, experimenting and learning on the job.
The process is frantic, exhausting, exhilarating and at times seriously demoralizing. For the big policy-oriented commission I suspect that this is the normal
context within which the research role is worked out. When uncertainties extend to the foci and themes of the future report, the resultant absence of a clear
sense of direction contributes to expanding the amount of research undertaken
as a safety measure.
4.

RESEARCHERS AND COMMISSIONERS: A FRUITFUL
TENSION

For the policy-oriented commission dependent on research for much of
its analysis, a crucial question is whether or not research is to be published in
whole, in part or not at all. The nature of the research, its role on the commission and indeed the structure and identity of the commission are profoundly
influenced by the answer. If there is to be an extensive published research
output, the commission is caught in a dualism of structure, identity and final
product. Effective leadership is necessary to ensure that the tension this may
engender is creative.
The decision to publish research has various consequences.
1. The published research may weaken the persuasive case that the report
makes for its recommendations. Whereas the report will seek to convince
the reader of the rightness of its policy recommendations, the separately
published research studies may identify roads not taken and weaknesses
in the report's intellectual underpinnings. Such research is the functional
equivalent of minority reports by dissenting commissioners, although it
lacks their high profile. In such cases, research provides some ammunition for the report's critics. While this may appear to weaken the report
from a narrowly political perspective, such discrepancies between report
and research add to the quality of the debate a royal commission should
engender.
2. The knowledge that research of acceptable quality will be published
helps to attract academics to a commission's research program. It also
means that their academic colleagues constitute an important audience
for their work. This enhances the significance of disciplinary considera-
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tions, possibly to the detriment of interdisciplinary research the commission may be trying to foster.
3. The dual output of research and report and the distinctive, if overlapping,
audiences to which they are directed, are likely to elicit some tension
between commissioners and researchers. Inevitably, the two groups will
weight the relative legacy of report and published research differently.
The commissioners will see research as an instrumental means for the
production of a high quality report, viewed as the raison d'etre of the
commission's existence. For individual researchers, and for those with
research management responsibilities - in the Macdonald case the three
research directors and the 21 individuals who co-ordinated the 19
subfields - the research is additionally viewed as a semi-independent,
discrete part of the commission's responsibilities. Part of the research
task will be seen as the provision of a published intellectual legacy of the
state of the debate on the subject matters the-commission addresses.
4. This dual research mandate may generate a subtle tension between the
commissioners' desire for policy advice and the academic temperament,
reinforced by the prospect of separate research publication, that is often
hesitant to make categorical statements about means-ends relationships.
5. In the early stages of the Macdonald Commission, the demands of a
complex research mandate and the commissioners involvement in an
exhausting hearings process tended to isolate senior research staff and
the commissioners from each other. Both were burdened by the pressures
of separate responsibilities that left them little time to prepare for the future when their isolation from each other would have to be bridged.
Further, the fact that most of the research topics had to be, and were,
selected before the first round of hearings was underway effectively
precluded a major impact of the latter on the selection of the former."
The early Commission decision that research of acceptable quality would
be published stimulated the research directors to create an infrastructure
designed to ensure the integrity of the research process. The three main
research streams were broken down into 19 subfields, each with one or two
academics acting as coordinators. They were responsible for the supervision
and monitoring of about 300 projects.
Most of the 19 subfields established Research Advisory Groups (RAGs)
that met several times to assess research progress and to offer advice.
Although they were composed mainly of academics, they also included a
sprinkling of public servants and practitioners from the private sector. These
RAGs broadened the constituency of academics and others involved with the
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Additional research projects were undertaken in response to issues arising in the hearings
and to specific requests from commissioners.
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Commission and increased the diversity of views that surfaced for discussion.
They were intended to produce some degree of cohesion, intellectual sharing
and sense of community among researchers working with a coordinator.
Research papers and monographs were sent to outside referees for evaluation. This often resulted in revisions. In a number of cases, following criticisms from referees, manuscripts were not recommended for publication.
The working assumption was that manuscripts that had gone through this
screening process and were recommended for publication, initially by the
coordinators and then by the research directors to the chairman, would be
published. On the whole, this procedure worked smoothly.
These arrangements reminded researchers that quality controls similar to
the adjudication process for reputable scholarly journals would be applied to
their work. They controlled the coordinators and research directors by
confronting potential idiosyncratic recommendations for publication with
negative assessments by external assessors. At the same time they depersonalized requests for revisions and rejections by locating their source in an
impartial process that was normal in academic communities. On the other
hand, the combination of positive assessments by referees and recommendations by both a coordinator and a research director for publication logically
inhibited any possibility of political objections from "on high" opposing
publication. These procedures to enhance the quality of research and to
control the exercise of discretion were effective.
The partial replication of a normal environment for academic research
reflected a crucial psychological consideration, the resistance of academics to
hierarchy, of being treated as staff. University hierarchies are loose and flexible. Authoritative direction is least evident on the research side on which
academic reputations are based. The prevalent assumption clearly is that
creativity is most likely to flourish in the absence of formal constraint and
direction and that the academic, like the artist, is driven by his/her own
demons in the detection and unravelling of puzzles. The exercise of this freedom takes place in a complex system of academic disciplines, journals,
professional associations, conferences, honours and the never-ending implicit
and explicit ranking of individuals and departments. The individual scholar, in
the evocative phrase of Michael Polanyi, belongs to a "society of explorers"
engaged in the collaborative task of finding patterns in the universe. 3 The
institutional structures of academic life link together individuals who
constantly influence each other by their published research although they may
never meet.
Accordingly, the research community is driven not by command or
authority, as conventionally understood, but by competitive evaluations and
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Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967) at 83-4.
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the reputations they foster, based primarily on published research. In matters
that concern research, this dependence on peer judgment makes academics
peculiarly resistant to thinking of themselves as staff and of their research as
subject to authoritatitive direction by hierarchical superiors. '
On the other hand, many of the Macdonald Commissioners were practical men and women of the world, accustomed to wielding authority and conscious of their responsibilities as commissioners. For some Commissioners,
the academic world and mind were alien. Commissioners hoped for answers
and the academics who "served" them often provided more questions. Some
Commissioners, at least in the early stages, would have liked to bring more
practitioners into the research streams. Not unexpectedly, the idea that academics were wordsmiths who did not understand the practicalities of business and
government was not entirely absent.
The system of mutual dependence in which academics and Commissioners found themselves did not conform to the idealized world of either
group. On the one hand, the university model of academic independence was
clearly unrealistic in a commission setting where the choice of subject,
timetable for submission and the influence of research were properly subject
to commission direction. On the other hand, the involvement of Commissioners in the direction and management of research, beyond agreeing to the
general parameters of research, could only be selective and intermittent. In
fact, for the Commissioners as a group, their numbers coupled with the parttime nature of their involvement led them to a board of governors model for
their role, with the crucial exception of the chairman who was, appropriately,
a powerful presence.
The partial separateness of the researchers' world on the Commission
was given extra support by the vastness of the research program and the share
of the budget it consumed. Presumably, a handful of researchers with a much
more limited research mandate would have been more tightly linked to other
units of the Commission.
It took some time to work out an acceptable pattern of relationships that
was compatible with the above academic dispositions while still respectful of
the central fact that research had to be relevant to the Commission's mandate,
had to be approved by senior commission staff and had to be submitted on
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Cynthia Williams and Doug Williams have both suggested in correspondence that implicit
in this paragraph, and elsewhere in the paper, there is a romanticization of the academic
role and a misunderstanding of the extent to which senior public servants are driven by
professionalism, looking inward to their professional consciences and outward to their
professional associations for norms to guide their discretion. They are simply driven, no
more than academics, by a command or authority system. Nevertheless, the academics on
the commission clearly tried to reconstruct a university context for their research which,
rightly or wrongly, they contrasted with a conflicting image of government bureaucracy.
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time or its utility would be lost. Even so, for some Commissioners, it is
probable that the academics continued to be viewed as a somewhat difficult
group, prone to seek an exaggerated independence and allegedly more
concerned with research for its own sake than for its contribution to the report.
Had the research been defined as simply for the internal use of Commissioners, and hence not to be published, the tension would have been reduced.
Such research could have dispensed with much of the normal scholarly
paraphernalia of reviews of the literature, disciplinary jargon, and the forbidding apparatus of footnotes. Such research would be closer to the normal
pattern of permanent officials advising political executives which is customary in the bureaucracy. Researchers would have been closer to being staff and
their subordination to Commissioners and senior commission officials would
probably have been more pronounced.
Speculatively, it may be suggested that research in such a context would
not only be different in nature - approximately more to policy-briefing
memos than to scholarly articles - but it would also be wekaer in quality than
research that is intended for publication. It would not be subject to the
constraints that attend research that is judged by scholarly peers nor to the
controls of bureaucratic conscience that guide civil servants in historic
branches of government. Further, given the hothouse atmosphere, the sense of
urgency and crisis and the fluidity that are abiding royal commission
characteristics, such unpublished in-house research might have become an
exercise in persuasion and manipulation to which the "court politics" aspect of
royal commissions lends itself.
In summary, the understanding that research is to be published gives
researchers an autonomy that may be viewed as unwelcome by some others on
the commission and it unavoidably leads to a dual commission output that
may weaken the political authority of the report, however, it almost certainly
contributes to the quality of the research and subjects it to professional norms.
Paradoxically, this increases the autonomy of the commissioners by reducing
the possibility of their manipulation by researchers. Prospective publication is
a device that keeps researchers honest, and thus serves the interest of the
commissioners.
5.

RESEARCH AND TIME CONSTRAINTS

It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of limited time as a constraint
on research and on the Commission more generally. Since an initial six
months was consumed in the start-up activities of selecting the Commissioners, appointing key staff and establishing the Commission structure and a
concluding six months was devoted to writing, editing, translating and
publishing the final report, the effective working time was cut by one-third.
Additional months were spent in assembling the research teams, appointing
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coordinators, and deciding what research to undertake. In the area of politics
and institutions, the research did not get fully underway until most of the first
year was over. For political science, this meant that about 80 projects, including lengthy overviews to edited volumes and a number of major monographs
had to be brought to completion in about 15 months if they were to be useful
to the commission.
Given this large research program, which was smaller than that mounted
by economics, any impression that the Commission provided an atmosphere
of monastic serenity for the unhurried examination of problems is categorically wrong. Both for research directors and for coordinators, the management of
research conflicted with its digestion.
While the size of the research program was no doubt partly driven by the
entrepreneurial ambitions of the research directors and coordinators, supported by appropriate budget allocations, the larger explanation lies in an intimidating mandate that seemed to exclude little from its purview and in the related fact that the Commission's own philosophy, or basic policy direction, only
emerged after virtually all of the research had been commissioned.
Time constraints also implied that much research would be devoted to
the repackaging and dissemination of conventional wisdom. Although the
emphasis varied from one research stream to the other, there was a considerable stress on survey articles that would consolidate the best academic
understanding available in discrete policy areas. This research definition was
present in the early research staffing decisions as the chairman clearly indicated that, unlike Rowell-Sirois, this Commission had a developed and substantial intellectual capital to exploit and bring to bear on the Commission's
agenda. Thus the perceived maturity of the academic disciplines, as well as
the constraints of time, worked against the undertaking of extensive original
research.
In retrospect, the maturity thesis was somewhat misleading. Where
policy concerns, such as the impact of free trade on sovereignty, involved
more than one discipline, the available literatures did not speak with a single
voice. Even when a policy question was primarily within one discipline, such
as the contribution of alternative electoral systems to the integrative capacities
of the Canadian party system, there was often no consensus on the particulars
of the most appropriate reform.
In reality, the "mature discipline" thesis, along with the constraints of
time, inhibited efforts to move away from the dominant intellectual orientations in each discipline. For various reasons this was particularly true of the
Commission's economics research. Simeon, accordingly, attributes the
Macdonald Commission's support for "contemporary mainstream neoclassical economics" to the absence of a "credible alternative," given the
Commissioners' perception that the major crisis they had to address was
economic and that neither the hearings nor the other two disciplines of law
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and political science produced the self-confident prescriptions on economic
issues that the neo-classical economists could deliver with virtual unanimity."'
Time constraints also worked against the Commissioners' assimilation of
the several hundred research reports which, in successive versions, cascaded
through their mailboxes in the period leading up to the final report. Not
surprisingly, not all of the research was available at the time when commission decisions on policy had to be made.
6.

INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH

Interdiscplinary research is much lauded and seldom effectively
practised. The Macdonald Commission, with a policy agenda that spanned
much of the activity of the modem state and focussed on policy areas that
transcended disciplinary boundaries, provided an obvious context for its
deployment. It was recognized from the early days of the Commission that no
single discpline had the breadth to respond to a generous mandate that excluded .little from its purview. Accordingly, the task of researching the interdependent realities of the "adaptive political economy"' 6 that the Commission sought to stimulate was given to the three disciplines of economics, political science and law.
Although individual researchers from other disciplines were employed
on a contract basis, they were in a distinct minority. Each of the three research
streams was headed by a research director. There was no research superior to
which the three research directors reported, although they were, of course,
accountable to the executive director, the chairman and the Commission as a
whole. The three streams varied in the resources they deployed and the
number of projects they mounted, from economics, which was the largest,
through political science to law, which was the smallest.
Given the mandate, the singling out of these three disciplines was not
illogical or arbitrary. Nevertheless, the inclusion of a respectable, rather than
token, scholarly representation from history, commerce, geography and
sociology would have been defensible. The economists' view of labour
markets, for example, could have been supplemented by the different labour
market perspective of sociologists. 7 More generally, a broader representation
of academic disciplines would have diversified the research input Commissioners received and thus would have modified the report they produced. On
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Richard Simeon, "Inside the Macdonald Commission" (Spring 1987) 22 Studies in Political
Economy at 171-3.
Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada,
Researchfor the Commission on Canada'sFuture:A ProgressReport (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, 1984) at 6.
Supra, note 8.
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the other hand, greater disciplinary diversity would probably have been
purchased at the cost of additional intellectual incoherence. More disciplines
would have compounded the already difficult problem of intellectual digestion.
The argument for three discrete research streams and a multi- headed
research structure, rather than grouping all researchers into a single integrated
unit with one research director, was based on the premise that the disciplines
involved were no longer infant and struggling, but mature. Disciplinary
maturity was held to inhibit the easy crossing of disciplinary boundaries
practised by the Rowell-Sirois scholarly generation of the late '30s.18 On the
other hand, establishing the research structure on disciplinary lines discouraged researchers from stepping outside of disciplinary boundaries and from
getting involved in the work of researchers in other streams. Thus the organization of research, as well as the privileging of three disciplines over others,
structured the academic analyses available to commissioners in particular
ways, with consequences for the substance and analyses of the Commission's
published report.
The research directors collaborated on numerous shared concerns on the
funding, quality and autonomy of research. They prepared successive
versions of an overall program of research which they took to meetings with
the Commissioners. They also spoke as a group to various public and semipublic gatherings. With the help of their coordinators, they produced the
interim commission research document, Research for the Commission on
Canada'sFuture:A ProgressReport. Along with their executive assistants,
they were heavily involved with the editorial team in the decisions that culminated in one of the largest publication programs in Canadian history.
Each research director tried to keep his fellow research directors
informed of what was going on in his domain; we were notified of each other's
various research meetings and occasionally attended them. This was also true
of the coordinators. In one area, federalism and the economic union, which
ultimately led to the publication of 12 volumes containing work by nearly 50
different authors, there was a relatively high degree of collaboration and joint
meetings involving all three disciplines. In the second summer, a number of
coordinators from all three research streams moved to Ottawa and various
theme seminars were held with Commissioners present.
In spite of the interdisciplinary tendencies noted above, the generally
civil and friendly relations among the three directors and the numerous
administrative arenas in which they collaborated, the overwhelming reality
was a very high degree of defacto separation of the three research streams. In
the accurate words of one senior research participant: "The frequently
expressed aspiration that the research program would serve as a vehicle for
18
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integration across disciplines was largely unfulfilled."' 9 As noted above, this
was partly due to structure - the autonomy of each of the three research
streams - the effects of which were compounded by the centrifugal scattering of the research enterprise across the country.
The crushing workload of managerial tasks in each research stream, and
for each coordinator, also conflicted with interdisciplinism. The first priority
was always to try to bring the commissioned research to completion. Since
this involved research advisory groups, external assessments, one or more
revisions and the addition of new projects as the focus of the commission
became clearer, extensive involvement in other research streams was a luxury
that almost no one could afford.
The commission research program was based on the premise that the
specialized knowledge of academic disciplines would initially be brought to
bear in the focused individual research projects undertaken by single investigators. The findings would then by synthesized and integrated as they were
brought to bear on the major policy areas encompassed by the mandate.'
In retrospect, this was a utopian aspiration with its presupposition that
integration would occur after the individual projects had been worked and
reworked through the lens of particular disciplines. At this point, the assumptions, logic and analysis were no longer flexible and open to outside influence.
They were embodied in finished products with their own internal symmetries
resistant to modification. They had the characteristics of self-contained building blocks, not of the malleable clay they might have been at their onset.
On the other hand, the disciplinary bias that triumphed had the virtue of
building on existing strengths. The goal of forging new models and methodologies for interdisciplinary work under the time pressures of a royal commission was unrealistic. Royal commissions are inappropriate contexts for
retraining and retooling with their high failure rates. At best, they can foster a
shallow eclecticism and a certain empathy across disciplinary boundaries. As
a result, "interdisciplinism" in the report, with some exceptions, came to be
an aggregation of work from different disciplines rather than an innovative,
creative fusion.
The basic casues for this "failure" are not primarily attributable to the
commission's research structure, but to the fragmentation of the academic
knowledge on which it drew. That knowledge and the specialized professoriate that exploits it are the end-products of an historically developed division
of intellectual labour that is unlikely to coincide with the policy concerns of an
ambitious royal commission agenda. Further, disciplinary (or even sub-field)
distinctions are not shallow, disposable intellectual fashions that rest lightly in
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academic minds. They embody laboriously assimilated intellectual capital and
they shape the world views and professional identities of their possessors.
Academic disciplines combine openness with ethnocentrism. Openness
is manifest in numerous cross-disciplinary linkages and in the recurrent emergence of new subfields spanning discplines which may come to constitute
separate intellectual universes. Changes in the external world which scholars
try to understand continually challenge disciplinary boundaries. From within,
individual scholars reach out to other disciplines when they become fascinated
by new puzzles resistant to solution by intradisciplinary paradigms. While
these tendencies and manifestations occur at more than glacial speed, at any
given time the dominant reality is a disciplinary ethnocentrism manifest in the
number of discplines whose introductory texts proclaim their status as the
master discipline or the queen of the disciplines. This inward-looking tendency is clearly function and stabilizing for each discipline - without it,
disciplines would cease to exist - although it hinders interdisciplinary work.
Academics may be viewed as citizens of particular disciplines, communities of the like-minded into which they are socialized by graduate work,
university departments, learned journals, professional associations and
systems of honours and awards. Disciplinary distinctiveness is also sustained
by the massive literature accumulated within each discipline, and now even
within disciplinary subfields. With the explosion of literature and new specializations even intradisciplinary mastery is an unattainable goal for even the
most gifted and diligent.
Different disciplines do not see the same world. For the political scientist, the state is the object of attention, and in liberal democracies, often of
affection. For the economist, the market holds pride of place. While the political scientist and the lawyer both accord salience to the system of rules and
regulations that emanates from the modem state, the political scientist is more
concerned with the political and bureaucratic process of their formation and
implementation than is the law professor who sees the state more in terms of
the judicial process and its interaction with private actors in society and
economy. Fruitful interaction between political scientists and economists
flounders on the fact that the concepts of nation and state, central to the
former, are much less central to the latter.
The difficulties these divisions create for interdisciplinary work is cogently summarized by David Easton.
We find ourselves in ... the Humpty-Dumpty phenomenon. Over the last two
thousand years we have managed to break the understanding of society into the
many pieces of specialties that now constitute the disciplines. When, however,
we try to put them all together again for purposes of application we have only
vague notions about how this might be done. We find it difficult to reconstitute
the reality we have been forced to decompose in order to understand it. This has
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become one of the major epistemological stumbling blocks in the way of the
utilization of the social sciences."
The maturing of the social science disciplines and law in Canada has
compounded the problem referred to by Easton. For the Rowell-Sirois generation of the '30s' disciplinary boundaries were fluid, numbers were much smaller
and "amateurs" like John Dafoe, the great Winnipeg journalist, could be
President of the Canadian Political Science Association; the CanadianJournal of Economics and Political Science, founded in 1935, was not only a
journal for both disciplines but also occasionally attracted work by anthropologists and sociologists; law professors sometimes published in it and participated at the annual meetings. Accordingly, part of the Rowell-Sirois
achievement, in producing a synthesizing political-economic interpretation
that influenced subsequent scholarly generations, was due to the limited
development of the disciplines that were brought together and the more
eclectic scholarship which that allowed.
No future generation of Canadian scholars, however, will be blessed with
that relatively easy interdisciplinary eclecticism of their predecessors. Even
modest amounts of interdisciplinary research, accordingly, will require
careful cultivation if they are to emerge in royal commission contexts.
One possibility is to search for the points of contact between disciplines
and construct interdisciplinary teams around such points. For example, some
models, schools and orientations that represent minority tendencies within
individual disciplines have strong extra-disciplinary links. Marxist political
economy transcends both political science and economics, as well as encompassing sociology and history. The bringing together of lawyers with a critical
legal studies perspective and political scientists and economists sharing a
Marxist political economy orientation would doubtless produce a degree of
empathy and understanding across disciplines much less likely to be found in
the more mainstream members of each discipline.
The suggestion, however, produces its own refutation. To concentrate on
scholars and orientations that exist at the intersection of different disciplines
would produce a narrow interdisciplinism at the heavy cost of excluding the
conventional wisdom of the disciplines in which they represent minority
tendencies. Further, the members of interdisciplinary minority schools are
often hostile to their mainstream colleagues. In their early years, they have the
characteristics of social movements seeking converts.
If our sights are lowered, modest moves towards interdisciplinism might
be facilitated if the following suggestions are kept in mind.
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1.

The capacity for interdisciplinary ventures probably varies with
academic personality type. Interdisciplinary skills are most likely to
emerge in scholars who are not disciplinary imperalists, but who have an
open playful attitude to other disciplines and lack a possessive attitude to
their own.
In the case of the Macdonald Commission, a small number of in-house
scholars from several disciplines, located in Ottawa, working closely
with each other and with the Commissioners, and educating each other,
might have produced a less sprawling, more integrated report. The
magnitude of the Macdonald Commission research effort, with some 300
projects mostly undertaken by individual academics, precluded housing
the researchers in Ottawa and thus worked against the proximity and
interaction that would seem to be necessary for interdisciplinary
research. A much smaller, focussed in-house team might have had an
enhanced capacity to respond to Stephen Clarkson's suggestion: "To be
useful for government ... the social scientist must operate by the same
criteria as a Deputy Minister with a doctorate in genralism."' ' This might
have produced a report less comprehensive and less confident in its small
details, but more integrated and more confident in its big pictures of the
Canadian state and its citizenry confronting the several challenges
identified in the terms of reference.

2.

7.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

It is difficult to isolate the influence of resarch in the overall internal
policy process of this or other commissions. The Macdonald report bears the
stamp of the Commissioners, is published under their names and is identified
with the chairperson. The Macdonald Commissioners were influential in
different walks of life, accustomed to authority and decision-making and
moulded by various experiences from which they had developed personal
philosophies they brought to the Commission. Their personal backgrounds
contributed to a functioning small group whose nature could not be entirely
predicted from what they individually brought to their common task. While
the chariman of such a body, like a Prime Minister, is first among equals and
has powers of persuasion and leadership that derive from his official status,
unlike a Prime Minister he has little hierarchical authority over his colleagues.
He cannot replace them; he cannot reshuffle them to less prestigious portfolios; and he lacks the support of cabinet solidarity. There is a tacit unspoken
understanding that each Commissioner carries in his knapsack the potential to
deliver a minority report. Indeed, to do so, as to issue dissenting opinions on
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the bench, may be seen as sending a brooding message to the future, one that
may outlive the majority position.
The Macdonald Commission experienced powerful centrifugal
pressures. The nature of the mandate, the number of Commissioners and the
diversity of their backgrounds, the amount of research and the three disciplinary streams through which it was channeled, and an extensive hearings
process constituted strong centrifugal organizational and intellectual tendencies that the Commission constantly struggled to overcome.
The Commissioners were the focal point for two major streams of potential influence, the hearings process and the research analyses. The influence of
the former is often slighted by critics who view it as essentially a legitimizing
requirement or as a consciousness-raising exercise to generate a supportive
climate for the pending report. While such criticisms may occasionally be
valid, my assessment of the Macdonald Commission case is that the hearings
process gave Commissioners a sense of confidence and a feeling for the vastness and diversity of the country that not all Commissioners had previously
experienced. It informed Commissioners of the political viability of prospective policy proposals. It highlighted phenomena, such as the strength and
vigour of the women's movement, that might otherwise have had a lesser
visibility. On the other hand, a commission whose agenda focuses on the long
run may be pulled too far in the direction of contemporary politics by the
pressures of the immediate issues that typically dominate the personal agenda
of petitioners.
Research posed its own problems for Commissioners. Several Commissioners implied, or stated, that the research was too abstract, clinical,
dehumanized and removed from the aspirations and sufferings of real
people.Y3 It is clear that far more research was produced than the Commissioners could possibly read. Further, the scattering of research produced some
studies which were off target. It is equally true that, even given the impressive
(or depressing) magnitude of the research effort, some approaches, issues,
etc., were understudied. An academic reviewer suggested that the political
science research on Canada in the international economy was biased infavour
of a neo-realist approach which stressed the constraints on policy-makers and
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failed to include research from a Marxist political economy perspective. 4
Some of the concerns the report dealt with received little or no attention in the
research program.' Several Commissioners objected to the market thrust of
the report and of the economics research.'
Commissioners doubtless found it awkward that as the lens changed
through which the Canada-United States free trade issue was viewed so too
did the answers. The discussion of the economic benefits of free trade was
largely the preserve of the economists, whose endorsment was little short of
lyrical. As the focus shifted to a host of related questions concerning sovereignty, autonomy, identity, the politics of protectionism in the United States
and the legal infrastructure of a free trade regime, political scientists and
lawyers assumed the main burden of answering. Their answers were much
more cautious, hesitant and uncertain than were those of the economists. Not
surprisingly, especially for political scientists whose concern is with such
political objects as state, nation and citizenship - how they are formed,
shaped, strengthened, weakened, and rise and fall - the free trade issue was
not seen just in terms of enhancing G.N.P. or of the efficiency of market
versus political allocations. Thus, within the Commission research community, the divisions of opinion on the free trade (and other) issues were not
randomly distributed across the three disciplines.
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The divorce between market concerns and state-nation concerns might
have been bridged had the economists on the Commission been advocates of a
more dirigiste, interventionist state as the instrument to achieve economic
objectives or had the political scientists and lawyers, with their greater proclivity to employ public instruments, played a central role in the contribution of
research to answering what were perceived as "economic" questions.
Although the role of the state in industrial policy and in regulation was part of
the research mandate in both law and political science, the economists
unquestionably dominated the research contributions to intra-commission
discussion of the major economic concerns. And, as Carmichael, Dobson and
Lipsey suggest in an unusually positive endorsement, the report "reflects the
remarkable consensus that has emerged within the economics profession over
the last decade." 27 Further, as Ronald Watts observed of the disciplinary division of labour on the Commission, the report's discussion of political institutions was not driven by economic goals, but by a "distinct set of political
norms."28
The limitations of research were most pronounced with respect to policy
dealing with "soft" areas, such as the effect of free trade on the political
autonomy, cultural integrity and civic identity of the Canadian state and its
citizens. On these questions, among the most important on the Comfiission's
agenda, research was helpful but provided no definitive answers. Contemporary academic specialization was more conducive to answering particular questions about electoral reform and the trade-off between high
minimum wages and high employment, than to constructing large macroanalyses of a historic people confronting fundamental choices about its future.
Neither research nor the hearings could banish the ultimate necessity of choice
by the Commissioners in these matters. Ground to stand on had to be sought
in social philosophies, intuitions and historic prejudices.
The terms of reference essentially asked, "what does it mean to be a
people, and what are the tasks of government in the late twentieth century?"
While the social sciences and law can provide inforation to such first order
political questions, they cannot provide definitive answers.
However, I fear I am going too far and leaving the erroneous impression
that the admitted difficulties of the research role on a commission such as this
should be equated with a failure of performance, an assessment that is clearly
ridiculous. Research, along with the hearings, constituted the raw materials
that were filtered through the philosophies and understandings of the Commissioners to produce the final report they signed. Further, most of the report was
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written by researchers. The Commission process produced a nucleus of
researchers, in the persons of the research directors and the coordinators, who
were intimately aware of the various parts of the mandate and who had
thought long and hard about how their disciplines could be brought to bear on
the issues the Commissioners decided to address. They had been educated by
the research program they administered, and they were the vehicles through
which its findings were orally communicated to Commissioners, in supplement of the written word, and found their way into the report. From this
perspective, the task of the resarch program was to get the relevent wisdom
from particular disciplines into the minds of a handful of individual researchers who then, along with others, engaged in a dialectical exchange with
Commissioners as draft chapters of the report took shape.
The influence of research on the Carter Commission, especially the key
role of Doug Hartle as research director, has been documented by Les MacDonald.29 A recent doctoral dissertation by David Fransen on the RowellSirois commission, supplemented by the assessment of Doug Owram, convincingly argues that its landmark report was the vehicle for an intellectual
consensus on the role of the state that had crystallized in the '30s in the emerging English Canadian social science elite. 3 Perhaps we are too close to the
Macdonald Commission for a similar judgment to be made about the influence
of research in general, but if attention is restricted to the economists it can
plausibly be argued that the imprint of mainstream economics is written large
on the pages of the report dealing with state- market relations, and the position
of Canada inthe international economy. The economists' influence was
supported by changes in the intellectual climate of western capitalist democracies, as the heady optimism previously sympathetic to state interventionism
waned and market virtues resurfaced.
Finally, with 70 published research volumes supplementing the three
volume report, the student of the policy process has access to the research
that, directly and indirectly, along with the hearings, influenced the Commission. In that sense, the Commission's total output serves democratic values,
not only by indicating one of the sources that positively influenced the
Commission, but also by making available analyses and arguments that did
not carry the day.
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